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Religious Exercise and Objections to Performing Same-Sex Marriage:
An Analysis of Kim Davis’s Claim
I.

Introduction
While the decision in Obergefell v. Hodges 1 , concluding that the right to marry is a

fundamental one for both same-sex and opposite sex couples, is applauded by some and rejected
by others, what cannot be denied is the host of secondary issues the decision brought with it, both
on a state and federal level. One such problem is how to handle the objections of those opposed
to same-sex marriage for religious reasons whose jobs task them with responsibilities related to
marriage. Especially when those individuals are government employees, charged with carrying
out governmental duties, the line between religious exercise protected by the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment, and Establishment Clause violations prohibited by the First Amendment,
can often become blurred. Now that the law of the land requires states to allow same-sex couples
to marry, questions of the duties of state employees responsible for carrying out state marriage
licensing requirements are even more important.
An example of such a controversy that has recently risen to the national spotlight is the debate
surrounding Kim Davis, the County Clerk of Rowan County, Kentucky, who, because of her
religious beliefs, stopped issuing marriage licenses to opposite sex couples and refused to issue
marriage licenses to same-sex couples after the decision in Obergefell.2 As County Clerk, Davis
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is responsible for “general clerical duties of the fiscal court.”3 Because of her position and job
responsibilities, Davis’ name and signature are required on every marriage license issued in Rowan
County.4 Davis’ objection garnered so much national attention that it has become a rallying point
upon which even Presidential hopefuls comment.5 Pope Francis’s brief meeting with Davis during
his visit to the United States similarly caused controversy, prompting the Vatican to go to great
lengths to distance the Pope from the situation after the fact. 6 The support for and opposition
against Kim Davis has been largely split along party lines, with several surprising exceptions.7
While coverage of the issue has become highly politicized, it does have important implications
moving forward post-Obergefell. As such, it is important to analyze how this situation will be
dealt with in the court system.

A. Facts
Kim Davis, the County Clerk for Rowan County, Kentucky, gained national recognition when
she refused to issue marriage licenses to same-sex (or opposite sex) couples following the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell.8 After the decision, Kentucky Governor Steven
Beshear notified all County Clerks that they should follow the new law of the land as announced
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ROWAN COUNTY CLERK, rowancountyclerk.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2016).
See Binder and Perez-Pena, supra note 2.
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Presidential hopeful Mike Huckabee was seen with Davis at a public appearance and started a petition to President
Obama, Attorney General Lynch, and Judge Bunning requesting the release of Davis from custody after she was
held in contempt of court. MIKE HUCKABEE, http://www.mikehuckabee.com/freekimdavis (last visited Jan. 29,
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Emma Green, Why Did Pope Francis Meet With Kim Davis?, THE ATLANTIC (Sep. 30, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/pope-francis-allegedly-met-with-kim-davis-what-does-itmean/408166/.
7
Surprisingly, the Mormon Church has taken a stand against Kim Davis’s actions, arguing that although they
oppose same-sex marriage, she should have followed the law. See Jack Healy, Mormons, still against same-sex
marriage, take stand against Kim Davis, THE SEATTLE TIMES, (Oct 22, 2015 at 4:57 P.M.),
http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/mormons-still-against-same-sex-marriage-take-stand-against-kim-davis/.
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in Obergefell, and issue same-sex marriage licenses. 9 A new marriage license form that was
gender-neutral, rather than listing husband and wife was attached to the notification.10 Three days
after the decision was handed down, Davis, citing her Christian beliefs, stopped issuing marriage
licenses and forbade those below her from issuing licenses for any couples. Her intention was to
avoid discriminating against same-sex couples by refusing to issue any marriage licenses at all,
thus precluding opposite sex couples, as well as same-sex couples from marrying.11 A few days
later, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued Davis on behalf of four couples (two samesex and two opposite sex.).12 U.S. District Judge for the District of Kentucky, David Bunning,
granted the Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction, and ordered Davis to issue licenses to same-sex (and
opposite sex) couples. After a series of pleas to higher courts to overrule the District Court’s
ruling, Davis was found in contempt of court for continuing to prevent the issuance of marriage
licenses and was jailed for five days in September of 2015. 13 Upon her release, pending further
litigation on the matter, a compromise was struck under which the Office of County Clerk of
Rowan County would continue to issue marriage licenses, but Deputy Clerks, rather than Davis
herself would sign the marriage license.14
Davis’ actions leading up to the announcement of the Supreme Court’s decision reveal a
carefully planned attempt to continue carrying out her job responsibilities in the manner she
believed her religious beliefs mandated, regardless of which way the Court decided. Before the
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Emergency Application to Stay Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal of Applicant, at E-34, Davis v. Miller, (No.
A15-__) [hereinafter App. to Stay Prelim. Inj.].
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See Binder and Perez-Pena, supra note 2.
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Mike Wynn and Chris Kenning, Timeline of Kentucky clerk’s gay marriage defiance, USA TODAY (Sep. 3, 2015
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13
Richard Perez-Pena, Governor-Elect Pledges to Take Clerk’s Name Off Kentucky Licenses, THE NEW YORK
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Supreme Court announced its decision in Obergefell, Davis reached out to the Kentucky
Legislature and Governor Beshear asking for the government to consider a bill that would protect
her and similarly situated clerks if the Supreme Court were to rule that same-sex marriage is a
constitutionally protected right, which it eventually did. 15 In a letter to Kentucky Senator
Robertson, Davis wrote: “I wanted to have the option, as a person who has deep moral conviction,
to choose not to discriminate any party, by allowing a Clerk to apply for an exemption for the
issuance of marriage licenses.”16 Although the deadline for presentation of bills on the floor was
around the corner when Davis wrote to Senator Robertson, she expressed her belief that it was
“imperative that we be ready to stand with our uncompromising convictions, holding strong to our
morals, and beliefs,” in the event that the Supreme Court ruled as it eventually did. 17 Likewise,
about a week after the ACLU filed suit against Davis, a different group of county clerks made a
plea for a special session of the Kentucky Legislature to be called so that a bill could be passed to
accommodate those who have religious objections to issuing same-sex marriage licenses, but were
denied by Governor Beshear. 18 Although her attempts to reach the Kentucky Legislature and
Executive went unheard, Kim Davis decided to pursue the same route anyway and refused to issue
marriage licenses to same-sex couples.19
While Davis’s situation in Kentucky has garnered national attention, with many expecting a
courtroom showdown, it seems the tides have turned in Kentucky. Governor Beshear, who has
“insisted that an act of the Legislature [is] required to change the [marriage form and that a
governor could not do it unilaterally,” will leave office on December 8, 2015.20 Governor-elect,
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App. to Stay Prelim. Inj. at E-36.
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Matt Bevin has made his views on the controversy known, promising to remove the names of
county clerks from the marriage forms.21 Bevin plans on removing the names of county clerks by
executive order, as one of his first acts as Governor of Kentucky when he takes office early this
December. 22 Bevin’s ultimate goal is to create a system in which marriage licenses are not
“something that the government grants; rather it should be a form that anyone can download at
will, and then submit to the government purely to be recorded.”23 It remains to be seen what
changes will occur in Kentucky once Governor-Elect Bevin takes office, but based on his public
statements thus far, it seems that Bevin anticipates a quick resolution to the controversy,
specifically, a resolution that does not include further litigation. Nonetheless, Davis’s dilemma is
important because it is likely to occur in other states as well.

B. Litigation History
While the media’s interest in Kim Davis intensified after the court found her in contempt and
placed her in jail for five days, from a legal standpoint, much of import happened both before and
after her jailing. Immediately following the decision in Obergefell, Davis stopped issuing any
marriage licenses, after her repeated attempts with Kentucky legislators to provide some protection
for conscientious objectors were left unanswered. 24 In July of 2015, just one week after the
Supreme Court decided Obergefell, which recognized marriage between same-sex couples as a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution,25 four couples (two same-sex and two opposite
sex) through the ACLU filed suit against Kim Davis in the District Court for the District of
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See Perez-Pena, supra note 13.
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Kentucky.26 The plaintiffs demanded that Davis issue them marriage licenses in Rowan County,
and sought a preliminary injunction to bar Davis from “refusing to issue marriage licenses to any
future marriage license applications submitted by the Named Plaintiffs.”27 In response, Davis filed
a verified third-party Complaint against Governor Beshear, as well as the Commissioner of the
Kentucky Department for Libraries and Archives, the state agency that designed the marriage
license forms.28 Davis also filed a motion for preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the
same-sex marriage mandate and to obtain an exemption from the job responsibility of authorizing
the issuance of marriage license in Kentucky.29
The District Court for the District of Kentucky entered an injunction against Davis enjoining
her from “applying her ‘no marriage licenses’ policy to future marriage license requests from the
named plaintiffs.” 30 District Court Judge David Bunning poignantly summed up the issue
underlying the litigation:

At its core, this civil action presents a conflict between two
individual liberties held sacrosanct in American jurisprudence. One
is the fundamental right to marry implicitly recognized in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The other is the right
to free exercise of religion explicitly guaranteed by the First
Amendment. Each party seeks to exercise one of these rights, but
in doing so, they threaten to infringe upon the opposing party’s
rights. The tension between these constitutional concerns can be
resolved by answering one simple question: Does the Free Exercise
likely excuse Kim Davis from issuing marriage licenses because she
has a religious objection to same sex marriage?31
Judge Bunning went on to answer that question in the negative.32
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App. to Stay Prelim Prelim. Inj. at 9.
Id. at 10.
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As this was a motion for preliminary judgment, Judge Bunning began by addressing the
Plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits.33 First addressing the fundamental right to marry,
Judge Bunning found that, “much like the statutes in Loving and Zablocki, Davis’s ‘no marriage
licenses’ policy significantly discourages many Rowan county residents from exercising their right
to marry and effectively disqualifies others from doing so.” 34 Davis attempted to refute the
Plaintiffs’ argument by bringing forth evidence that there were several other options for obtaining
marriage licenses.35 The court, however, denied each of these alternatives in turn. Davis argued
that the County Executive Judge could issue the licenses to the couples.36 The court disagreed
with Davis’s interpretation of the Kentucky statute allowing the County Executive Judge to issue
marriage licenses in the absence of the County Clerk, and found that the application of the statute
as suggested by Davis would be a “manipulation of statutorily defined duties.”37 Davis also argued
that post-Obergefell, more options would be available for couples to seek marriage licenses.38 The
court found that those were not feasible present alternatives, and thus, had “no impact on the
Court’s ‘substantial interference’ analysis.39 Davis’s strongest argument was that the Plaintiffs
could obtain marriage licenses from any of the seven counties surrounding Rowan County.40 Yet,
the court took issue with this argument as well, worrying that implicit within that argument is the
presumption that no other County Clerks would abstain from granting marriage license to same
sex-couples even if Davis was successful. 41 While ultimately finding that this was the only
feasible alternative, the court was not satisfied, posing the question, “[e]ven if Plaintiffs are able
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Id. at 10.
Id. at 14.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 11.
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Id. at 13.
38
Id. at 14.
39
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40
Id. at 12.
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Id. at 12.
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to obtain licenses elsewhere, why should they be required to?”42 Because the policy significantly
discourages Rowan County residents from exercising their right to marry, the court applied a
heightened level of scrutiny to the policy.43
Since Davis’s action was found to be subject to strict scrutiny, Judge Bunning addressed the
state’s compelling interest. 44 Davis argued that the state interest at play was its “interest in
protecting her religious freedom.”45 Although Judge Bunning agreed that the state does have a
compelling interest in protecting free exercise, he found that the State had several compelling
interests that ran contrary to Davis’s action, including the interest in preventing Establishment
Clause violations and the interest in upholding the rule of law.46 Because Davis failed to meet the
strict scrutiny test, the court concluded that the “policy likely infringes upon Plaintiffs’ rights
without serving a compelling state interest,” and that “Plaintiffs have demonstrated a strong
likelihood of success on the merits of their claim.” 47 Thus, the first factor of the test for a
preliminary injunction weighed in favor of the plaintiffs. The court further found that because the
right to marry is a fundamental constitutional right, denial of that right results in irreparable harm,
thus the second factor also weighed in favor of the plaintiffs.
In assessing whether a preliminary injunction would substantially harm Davis, the third factor
in the analysis, the court held that Governor Beshear’s directive did not aim to suppress religious
practice48 and that because Davis’s “speech (in the form of her refusal to issue marriage licenses)
is a product of her official duties, it is not likely entitled to First Amendment protection,” thus
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Id. at 14.
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Davis is “unlikely to succeed on her compelled speech claim.”49 Judge Bunning also dismissed
Davis’s argument that conducting her job duties would violate the Religious Test Clause of Article
VI of the Constitution.50 Finally, Davis argued that she would suffer substantial harm under the
Kentucky RFRA if the preliminary injunction were granted. 51 The court did not agree that Davis
was being substantially burdened, because she was “simply being asked to signify that couples
meet the legal requirements to marry. The State [was] not asking her to condone same-sex unions
on moral or religious grounds, nor [was] it restricting her from engaging in a variety of religious
activities.”52 Thus, the third factor, whether or not Davis would be substantially harmed by the
grant of preliminary injunction, also weighed in favor of the plaintiffs.
Finally, the court considered the public interest.53 Judge Bunning found that because it is in
the best interest to preserve constitutional rights, and because Davis’s policy not only burdens the
constitutional rights of others, but is also unlikely to be afforded constitutional protection, the
fourth factor weighed in favor of the Plaintiffs as well.54 Finding that all four factors weighed in
favor of granting the requested relief, the Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction against Kim
Davis was granted and Davis’s motion for preliminary injunction was dismissed.55
After the August 12, 2015 decision by U.S. District Judge David Bunning, Davis applied to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to grant a stay of Bunning’s decision.56 When the
Sixth Circuit denied the motion, Davis applied for a grant of stay to the United States Supreme
Court, which also refused to grant the stay.57 Her brief to the United States Supreme Court made
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Id. at 25.
Id. at 26.
51
Id. at 27.
52
Id.
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Id. at 28.
54
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essentially the same arguments she made to the District Court.58 Two days after the Supreme
Court’s denial, on September 3, 2015, Davis was found in contempt of court for continuing to stop
marriage licenses from being issued in Rowan County and was taken to jail.59 After five days in
jail, a compromise was reached that would allow Davis to return to work and oversee the issuance
of marriage licenses, while not being forced to sign same-sex marriage licenses herself.60

C. Roadmap of the Paper
This paper will attempt to analyze Kim Davis’s situation, which is likely to come up in other
counties in Kentucky and in other states in the United States, through the lens of both Kentucky
and Federal law. This paper will also look to approaches taken in nations that legalized same-sex
marriage earlier than the United States and as such, have more experience crafting solutions to
deal with civil servants’ religious objections to aspects of their jobs that in some way involve
marrying same-sex couples.
Part II of this paper will give a general background of the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment to set the stage for the analysis of Kim Davis’s argument that her objection to signing
same-sex marriage licenses is protected by the First Amendment and related statutes. Next, Part
III of this paper will evaluate Davis’s claim under Kentucky state law, including the Kentucky
Constitution and the Kentucky Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (K-RFRA). Part III will
also examine generally whether similar RFRA statutes in other states would grant the same
protection to those similarly situated to Kim Davis. Part IV of this paper will analyze Davis’s
claim under Federal law, recognizing that as a general proposition, a lessened level of scrutiny
applies federally because the Supreme Court invalidated the Federal RFRA. Part IV will also
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consider, by analogy, whether Davis would have any recourse against the Federal government, if
she had been fired for her religious objection. Part IV will end by providing a brief summary of
the approaches taken abroad to similar situations, and deciding whether these techniques could
prove useful in the United States. Finally, Part V of this paper will conclude by summing up and
offering final remarks regarding the general trends to watch for and the possibilities in this area of
First Amendment law.

II.

Background of Free Exercise Clause
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states in relevant part that “Congress

shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof…” 61

Two distinct protections are provided by the Religion Clauses of the First

Amendment: protection of the Free Exercise of Religion and protection against Establishment of
Religion.62 There is tension between these two clauses:

On the one hand, the government is prohibited from establishing
religion. On the other hand, the free exercise of religion cannot be
prohibited. By allowing the free exercise of religion, the
government runs the risk of showing favoritism towards a certain
religion. This may be construed as encouraging the establishment
of that religion or sect.63
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment is the clause that is relevant for purposes of
analyzing Kim Davis’s claims.64 While the Free Exercise Clause will be the focus of analysis, the

61

U.S. CONST., amend. 1.
Philip Spare, Free Exercise of Religion: A New Translation, 96 DICK. L. REV. 705, 707 (1992).
63
Id.
64
“Most free exercise claims involve requests for exemptions from laws that interfere with how a group or
individual practices religion . . . The jurisprudence of free exercise, in short, is the jurisprudence of constitutionally
compelled exemption.” Id. at 706. Here, Kim Davis is seeking an exemption from the duty of signing same-sex
marriage licenses, or in the alternative, an exemption from signing marriage licenses altogether.
62
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Establishment Clause is relevant here because it provides important limits on the Free Exercise
Clause. As it is the main body of law implicated here, a brief history of the Free Exercise Clause
is crucial in understanding Davis’s current situation and the possible legal outcomes.
Although the Free Exercise Clause became law when the Bill of Rights was signed in 1791, it
was not until 1878 that the Supreme Court decided what is considered to be the first significant
case involving the Free Exercise Clause.65 In Reynolds v. United States, a Mormon man was
charged with violating a federal law prohibiting the practice of polygamy.66 The Court considered
the question of whether the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution mandated an exception for
those whose religion included the practice of polygamy.67 After partaking in an historical analysis
of the views of Madison and Jefferson, and of the drafting of the First Amendment, the Court
concluded that while Congress could not regulate opinion, it could legislate against actions.68 The
distinction made in Reynolds between belief and actions – that Congress could not regulate belief,
but could regulate action – is still an important part of free exercise law.69
In 1940, in Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Free Exercise Clause was incorporated through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and made applicable to the states, vastly
increasingly the potential for Free Exercise litigation and development in the law. 70 In a case
involving Jehovah’s Witnesses right to proselytize, the Court reiterated the holding of Reynolds,
concluding that while the freedom to believe is absolute, the freedom to act cannot be absolute.71
Cantwell is also notable as the first of many cases in the 1940s in which the outcome of a Free

65

Id. at 707.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878).
67
Id.
68
Id.
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Spare, supra note 62 at 707.
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Exercise analysis was largely dependent on whether any other constitutional rights were involved
in the religious conduct.72
In 1963, in Sherbert v. Verner, the Supreme Court reevaluated the test to be used in Free
Exercise cases.73 In Sherbert, the Court held that a South Carolina textile worker who was fired
because she refused to work on her Sabbath, which fell on Saturdays, could not be denied
unemployment compensation benefits.74 The Court set forth a three-prong test, which raised the
level of scrutiny in Free Exercise cases whether or not another fundamental right is involved.75
First, the court should determine whether a law imposes a burden on free exercise. Second, if a
burden is found, the court is tasked with determining whether the government has a compelling
interest that justifies the burden. Finally, if the state has a compelling interest, it must show that
the interest could not be achieved through a less restrictive means.76 In perhaps the most expansive
application of the Sherbert strict scrutiny test, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court held that the State
could not force the parents of Amish children to keep them in school until the age of sixteen.77
Sherbert was the law of the land until 1990, when the Court decided Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith. The individual seeking Free Exercise
protection in Smith was a drug counselor who was denied unemployment compensation after he
was fired from his job at a rehabilitation center for ingesting peyote in a religious ceremony. 78 In
Smith, the Court held that religious convictions do not excuse individuals from following neutral
laws of general applicability.79 Smith dramatically changed the way the Free Exercise Clause was
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construed, essentially reducing the strict scrutiny standard government action is held to, and
instead applying a rational basis review where the law at issue is neutrally applicable.80
In 1993, as a reaction to Smith, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA).81 The statute mandated strict scrutiny, so that once an individual brought forth evidence
that their religious practice as substantially burdened, the government must come back with a
showing of compelling interest and a showing that the method the government chose was the least
restrictive means.82 This level of review would apply whether or not the law was neutral and
generally applicable.83 In City of Boerne v. Flores, RFRA was held to be unconstitutional as
applied to the states, as an improper exercise of Congress’s enforcement power.84 RFRA continues
to be applicable to the federal government and many state governments have enacted their own
Religious Freedom Restoration Acts.85 As a result, the system of exemptions is fractured across
the states and between the state and federal government, further complicating the issue of Kim
Davis’s objection to signing same-sex marriage licenses.

III.

State Analysis
A. Kentucky

Kim Davis’s objection to issuing marriage licenses is a controversy that is likely to arise in
other states post-Obergefell, thus it will be important to analyze similar situations in other states
and on a federal level. Because this case of first impression will be decided under Kentucky law,

80

Spare, supra note 62 at 723.
Marci A. Hamilton, The Case for Evidence-Based Free Exercise Accommodation: Why the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act is Bad Public Policy, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 129 (Winter 2015).
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it is crucial to first examine the existing legal landscape in Kentucky and what protections that
landscape will and will not supply.
Section 5 of Kentucky’s Constitution guarantees the right to religious freedom. For purposes
of this paper, the relevant portion of that section provides that: “…the civil rights, privileges, or
capacities of no person shall be taken away, or in anywise diminished or enlarged, on account of
his belief or disbelief of any religious tenet, dogma, or teaching. No human authority shall, in any
case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience.”86 While this language may give
the impression that the Kentucky Constitution grants greater protection to the practice of religion
than the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court of Kentucky
explicitly disavowed such an interpretation in Gingerich v. Commonwealth. 87 At issue in
Gingerich was a Kentucky state statute requiring slower-moving vehicles to display an emblem to
warn other vehicles of its slow speed.88 Members of the Old Order Swartzentruber Amish claimed
that both the color and the shape of the emblem were at odds with their religious beliefs, and that
forcing them to display the emblem would be forcing them to adopt a symbol with which they did
not agree.89 In holding that the statute was constitutional and did not violate the rights of the
Amish, the Court elaborated on the proper interpretation of Section 5 of the Kentucky
Constitution.90 The Court opined: “Certainly, the language in the Kentucky Constitution is more
specific. But it is linguistically impossible for language to be more inclusive than that in the First
Amendment…”91 Citing Kentucky precedent that closely mirrors United States Supreme Court
precedent, the Court continued, explaining that

86

K.Y. CONST. Sec 5.
Gingerich v. Com., 382 S.W.3d 835, 837 (Ky. 2012).
88
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Id. at 840.
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…religious freedom has two components: freedom to believe and
freedom to act. What one chooses to believe is an absolute freedom,
which no power on earth can in reality arbitrate. But in the nature of
things, freedom to act cannot be absolute in human society where
beliefs and practices vary, and where a given practice, absolutely
freely enacted, can inflict harm on others. Thus religious conduct
must remain subject to regulation for the protection of society.92
Thus, Section 5 of the Kentucky Constitution has been interpreted similarly to the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution in that a distinction has been recognized between
the freedom to believe and the freedom to act, with the freedom to act less vehemently protected,
allowing for actions based on one’s religion subject to limitation, upon the government meeting a
burden of proving that the limitation is necessary in order to protect the rights of others or the
public good. In Gingerich, the Kentucky Supreme Court found that “statutes, regulations, or other
governmental enactments which provide for the public health, safety, and welfare, and which are
statutes of general applicability that only incidentally affect the practice of religion, are properly
reviewed for a rational basis under the Kentucky Constitution, as they are under the federal
constitution.”93 Thus, Gingerich confirms that the proper constitutional analysis to be applied to
free exercise claims based on laws that are not directly aimed at religion is rational basis review.94
Under rational basis review, legislative means must bear rational relationship to a legitimate state
end, and laws will be held invalid when totally unrelated to the state’s purpose in enacting the
law.95 As such, legislation requiring Kim Davis, or more generally, all county clerks to sign all
marriage licenses, whether they be between same-sex or opposite-sex couples, would only be
invalid if such a law bore no rational relation to the legislative purpose of carrying out marriage

92

Id. at 840-41.
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ceremonies. Although Davis relies on Section 5 of the Kentucky Constitution in her Emergency
Application to Stay Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal submitted to the United States
Supreme Court, it is unlikely that a court would entertain such a claim.96 Thus, the Kentucky
Constitution alone does not protect Kim Davis.
Although the Kentucky Constitution alone would not likely protect Kim Davis, Kentucky is
one of a sizable number of states that has legislatively enacted greater religious protection than
that provided by either their state constitution or the federal Constitution. In 2013, Kentucky
passed its Religious Freedom Restoration Act (K-RFRA), based on the federal Religious Freedom
Restoration Act that was invalidated in City of Boerne.97 The Kentucky law states that:
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s freedom of
religion. The right to act or refuse to act in a manner motivated by a
sincerely held religious belief may not be substantially burdened
unless government proves by clear and convincing evidence that it
has a compelling governmental interest in infringing the specific act
or refusal to act and has used the least restrictive means to further
that interest. A ‘burden’ shall include indirect burdens such as
withholding benefits, assessing penalties, or an exclusion from
programs or access to facilities.98
The effect of the state K-RFRA is to raise the standard that applies constitutionally (rational basis
review) to strict scrutiny where free exercise claims are involved. As noted in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., by analogy, the K-RFRA is similar to the federal Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, which was enacted to “provide very broad protection for religious liberty.” 99
RFRA analysis involves a two-step process: first, the claimant must show that his religious
freedom is being substantially burdened; next, the government must meet strict scrutiny by
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showing that there is a substantial government interest and that there are no less restrictive means
for the government to fulfill that purpose.100 The showing of burden on religious freedom has
been interpreted broadly, in part because the courts are hesitant to analyze the validity of the
claimant’s religious beliefs, and instead attempt only to look at the sincerity of that belief.101
Although the breadth of RFRA seems vast, there is an important limit on its reach – the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. As the United States Supreme Court explained in
Cutter v. Wilkinson, “[o]ur decisions recognize that ‘there is room for play in the joints’ between
the [Free Exercise and Establishment] Clauses, some space for legislative action neither compelled
by the Free Exercise Clause nor prohibited by the Establishment Clause”102 In other words, while
the State must protect the free exercise of religion, in doing so, it cannot go so far as violating the
Establishment Clause.103 Although this limit does exist, in most cases dealing with the balance,
the Court has refused to find that the government action to protect free exercise has gone far
enough to violate the Establishment Clause.104 Nevertheless, it is important to keep that limitation
in mind in analyzing Free Exercise issues, as it also applies to state RFRA claims.
In applying Kentucky’s K-RFRA to the facts at hand, Kim Davis has argued that Governor
Beshear’s directive “not only substantially burdens her free exercise rights by requiring her to
disregard sincerely-held religious beliefs; it does not serve a compelling state interest.”105 Davis
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also argues that: “Governor Beshear could easily grant her a religious exemption without adversely
affecting Kentucky’s marriage licensing scheme, as there are readily available alternatives for
obtaining licenses in and around Rowan County.” Indeed, Davis lists several alternatives that she
deems less restrictive than Governor Beshear’s post-Obergefell mandate. Davis argues that by
mandating that she sign her name on a marriage certificate between same-sex couples, the State is
forcing her to condone same-sex marriage, which she cannot do because of her religion.106 The
District Court found that the burden on Davis’s religious freedom is “more slight” than she argues.
According to the District Court, “Davis is simply being asked to signify that couples meet the legal
requirements to marry. The State is not asking her to condone same-sex unions on moral or
religious grounds.”107 In considering injunctive relief, the District Court did not reach the strict
scrutiny analysis because it found that there was no burden on Davis’s practice of religion. Upon
further review, in the context of a disposition on the merits of the case rather than an injunction,
this conclusion may be questionable.
The District Court found that there was no substantial burden because it interpreted the act of
signing the marriage certificate as simply certifying that the requirements for marriage have been
met.108 This holding, however, is inconsistent with the general tendency of courts to defer to
claimant on the significance of the act that is in conflict with their religion.109 This tendency, as
noted, flows in part from the Court’s determination that while questioning the sincerity of an
individual’s religious belief is proper, questioning the correctness or importance of those beliefs
within the claimant’s belief system is improper. A court analyzing this situation on the merits,
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rather than in determining whether an injunction should issue, very well may find that questioning
Kim Davis’s claim that signing the marriage certificate forces her to condone same-sex marriage,
which is against her religious beliefs, is an improper valuation of either the correctness of her
beliefs, or the importance of those beliefs within her overall belief system. If that is the case, then
a court would likely find that forcing Kim Davis to sign the marriage certificates or resign imposes
a substantial burden on her free exercise rights.
The analysis of the burden question is critical because of the high burden that strict scrutiny
puts on the government. The strict scrutiny standard of review has been called “strict in theory
and fatal in fact.”110 Although generally, when it comes to religious exemptions, strict scrutiny is
considered less than fatal, it is still an enormous hurdle for the government to overcome. 111 It
seems likely that a court would find that the Governor’s mandate fulfills a substantial state interest
– that of carrying out the law the Supreme Court passed down in Obergefell. The least restrictive
means test, however, may be harder for the government to satisfy. 112 Although the court took issue
with several of the suggestions Davis proposed, several others were not addressed because the
District Court did not reach the strict scrutiny test in its analysis. The court could find that
something other than requiring Kim Davis to sign same-sex marriage certificates is the least
restrictive means to pursue the government interest. Perhaps the court could even find that the
temporary process in place currently, that Davis continues to oversee the County Clerk’s Office
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and is not required to sign the same-sex marriage certificates, but is required not to interfere with
their signing, is a less restrictive means. It is reasonably possible that if the burden determination
is overturned, the government may fail strict scrutiny and be forced to grant an exemption to Kim
Davis.

B. Other States
Kim Davis’s situation will be resolved using Kentucky law, but because this question is likely
to arise in other states as well, it is helpful to determine how this issue would be resolved under
state law in states that do not have the same framework as Kentucky. Seventeen states, including
Kentucky, have Religious Freedom Restoration Acts and eleven states have interpreted their state
constitutions’ religious freedom provisions to require strict scrutiny, thus rendering a similar result
as a state RFRA would.113 One state, Alabama, has enacted a constitutional amendment similar to
an RFRA.114 Four states have held that there is no strict scrutiny under the state constitution and
have no state RFRA.115 Twelve additional states have no state RFRA and have made no decision
on their state constitution.116 In four states, courts have explicitly expressed their uncertainty, but
have declined to resolve the question.117 One state, New York, has interpreted its constitutional
religious freedom provisions to require weak intermediate scrutiny.118
In states with RFRAs, states that have interpreted their state constitutions’ religious freedom
provisions to require strict scrutiny, and the state with a RFRA-like constitutional amendment, the
result of the analysis would be the same as in Kentucky. In states that have no RFRA, states that
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have made no decision regarding their state constitution, and states that have expressed uncertainty
and declined to resolve the issue, it is futile to attempt to guess what standard the court will use.
In states with no state RFRA that have decided that strict scrutiny standard does not attach to their
constitutional religious freedom provisions, Smith would apply. Under Smith, “the right of free
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with ‘valid and neutral laws of
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes).’”119 In other words, where a law is valid and neutral in its applicability
and does not specifically have the purpose of regulating religious activity, 120 free exercise of
religion is no defense to failing to abide by the law.121 In a state that follows Smith, Kim Davis,
or a similarly situated clerk would be offered no protection. Governor Beshear’s mandate
requiring County Clerks to authorize same-sex as well as opposite-sex marriages, is not aimed at
regulating religion; rather, its purpose is to carry out the law of the land after Obergefell. Thus,
Kim Davis’s religious objections would not require an accommodation from the government.122
New York’s state interpretation of religious freedom is an interesting case which may lead to
results different than anywhere else in the nation. New York courts have interpreted the state
constitutional protection as requiring a weak intermediate scrutiny.123 The Court of Appeals of
New York traced the history of the state’s constitutional religious freedom protections and laid out
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the test to be used in Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio.124 The court explained
that it had previously held “that when the State imposes ‘an incidental burden on the right to free
exercise of religion’ we must consider the interest advanced by the legislation that imposes the
burden, and that ‘the respective interests must be balanced to determine whether the incidental
burdening is justified.’”125 The court further acknowledged that it had never set out “how the
balancing is to be performed.”126 To give clear guidance to lower courts, the court postulated that:
“substantial deference is due the Legislature, and that the party claiming an exemption bears the
burden of showing that the claimed legislation, as applied to that party, is an unreasonable
interference with religious freedom.”127 The test laid out by the court, while less defensive of
religious rights than the strict scrutiny tests adopted in many state RFRAs, is more protective of
religious exercise than the default rule, as laid out in Smith, that would otherwise apply. While
holding that the burden of “showing that an inference with religious practice is unreasonable, and
therefore requires an exemption from the statute, must be on the person claiming the exemption,”
the court pointed out that the burden “should not be impossible to overcome.”128
At issue in Catholic Charities was the Women’s Health and Wellness Act, which mandated
expanded health insurance coverage for various services needed by women.129 A provision of the
law required employer health insurance contracts that provide coverage for prescription drugs to
include coverage for contraceptive drugs or devices.130 The statute included an exemption for
religious employers, but Catholic Charities argued that the exemption was unconstitutionally
narrow, as to violate their free exercise rights, because it excluded church-affiliated groups, like
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Catholic Charities, that were not closely enough affiliated with the religious entity to meet the
religious employer exemption.131 The court found that Catholic Charities “fell short of making a
showing that the State interfered unreasonably with their right to practice religion.”132 While the
court recognized that the law placed a burden on Catholic Charities religious practices, it pointed
out that the law does not compel them to purchase contraceptive coverage for their employees;
rather, “policies that provide prescription drug coverage include coverage for contraceptives.
Plaintiffs are not required by law to purchase prescription drug coverage at all.”133 As such, while
the law did burden the plaintiff’s rights, it did not substantially burden the plaintiffs’ rights. In
contrast to the burden on the plaintiffs’ exercise of religion, was the importance of the State’s
substantial interest in providing better health care; specifically providing better health care for
women, based on comprehensive evidence that women received less adequate healthcare coverage
than men. Further, the legislature specifically considered including a broader religious employer
exemption, but determined that doing so would leave too many women uncovered by the statute.
Accordingly, Catholic Charities failed the intermediate scrutiny test.
Decisions of the appeals courts interpreting the New York constitutional protection of the free
exercise of religion (and not the federal Constitution protection of the free exercise of religion),
and its application of the rule in Catholic Charities, tend to show that the courts generally reject
free exercise claims under this balancing test.134 It seems likely that given this standard, a free
exercise claim like Kim Davis’s would be rejected in New York. If Davis’s claim were to be heard
in New York, the court would have to balance the interest of her right of religious worship against
the interest the state seeks to enforce, here, the implementation of the United States Supreme
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Court’s mandate that same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry. Based on New York
precedent, it is more than likely that the state’s interest in carrying out the law would outweigh
Davis’s objection to her part in enforcing the new law after Obergefell.135 In analyzing how this
situation would turn out under various state laws, it seems that, in states with RFRAs or
constitutional interpretation requiring strict scrutiny, a free exercise claim like Kim Davis’s may
have some merit. To the contrary, in New York, which uses a weak intermediate scrutiny, and
states that apply rational basis review, it seems likely that the state interest would outweigh Davis’s
free exercise claim.

IV.

Federal Analysis
A. Smith applies

While the decision of how to handle Kim Davis and other religious objectors who refuse to
carry out same-sex marriages is currently being decided on a state-by-state basis, it is important to
determine how this issue would be determined on a federal level, because such issues may arise
on a federal level in the future. Alternatively, the federal government may have to step in to make
sure that federal fundamental rights are protected. As a starting proposition, on the federal level
Smith would apply. Under Smith, no religious accommodation is required for a valid and neutral
law of general applicability. 136 While this, of course, does not mean that the government is
forbidden from extending an accommodation, the court cannot force the government to grant an
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exemption from the law.137 Where Smith applies, Kim Davis and similarly situated clerks are not
protected or guaranteed an exemption from the law. Governor Beshear’s mandate requiring
Kentucky County Clerks to sign both same-sex and opposite-sex marriage license, or a law
requiring the same thing, is a generally applicable neutral law, as described in Smith. The mandate
in this case, which could very well become law in other cases, is one that applies equally to all
clerks, and is not aimed at religious believers, as the law was in Lukumi.138 Thus, the government
entity is not required to grant an exemption to the religious believers whether or not the neutrally
applicable law is burdensome to the free practice of the believer’s religious exercise. Of course,
there are likely to be circumstances under the Smith framework in which, in order to foster peace
within the organization, and because of the ease of doing so, the governmental entity will grant
informal exemptions to the rule. An example of such an informal exemption in Kim Davis’s case
would be for the office to arrange for someone else to sign the marriage certificate whenever Kim
Davis felt that signing the marriage certificate would be problematic in the face of her religious
beliefs.139 All the same, Smith provides no legal protection for Kim Davis or similarly situated
religious objectors under federal law.

B. Title VII Framework
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed by Congress to “eliminate certain bases
for distinguishing among employees while otherwise preserving employers’ freedom of
choice.”140 By “passing Title VII, Congress made the simple but momentous announcement that
sex, race, religion, and national origin are not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or compensation
of employees.”141 Under Title VII, three factors are required for an employee to establish a prima
facie claim of religious discrimination.142 First, the employee must show that she holds a sincere
religious belief that conflicts with a job requirement.143 Next, the employee must show that she
informed her employer of the conflict.144 Finally the employee must show that she was disciplined
for failing to comply with the conflicting requirement.145 Upon establishment of all three factors,
the burden shifts to the employer to show either “it made a good-faith effort to reasonably
accommodate the religious belief, or such an accommodation would work an undue hardship upon
the employer and its business.”146 Further, “[a]n accommodation constitutes an undue hardship if
it would impose more than a de minimis cost on the employer.”147 Undue hardships will be found
based on both economic and non-economic costs to the employer.148 There are generally two types
of accommodations employers grant employees under Title VII: first, in some cases, the employer
will exempt the employee from whatever work rule or condition conflicts with the employee’s
religious belief or practices, while in others, the employer will allow the employee to transfer to a
reasonably comparable position where conflicts are less likely to arise.149 For purposes of this

140

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989).
Id.
142
Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2009).
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 available at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/titlevii.cfm.
141

27

paper, it is more valuable to focus on situations in which the employer exempts the employee from
the condition that interferes with the employee’s religious belief or practices, because many of the
proposed solutions adopt such a procedure.
Although not directly applicable here, the framework created by Title VII is an interesting lens
through which to view the general situation in which an employer fires an employee for a religious
belief that interferes with his or her job responsibilities. It would be interesting to analyze whether
Davis would have any recourse against the government if she were fired for refusing to issue
marriage licenses. Title VII is not applicable to Kim Davis’ situation for an important reason: as
County Clerk of Rowan County, Kim Davis is an elected official and therefore cannot be fired
from her job. In order to be removed from office, under the Kentucky Constitution, Kim Davis
would have to be impeached by the Kentucky House of Representatives and then tried by the
Kentucky Senate.150
If the State of Kentucky fired Kim Davis, and Title VII was applicable, would Davis have a
claim under Title VII? The compromise struck allowing Davis to retain her position and have
Deputy Clerks sign the marriage licenses rather than her signing them, is a common type of
accommodation employers can offer under Title VII. But what if such an accommodation was not
offered, and instead, Davis was fired? If Davis was fired, the analysis would proceed by first
requiring her to show that she holds a sincere religious belief that conflicts with her job duties, that
her employer was aware of such a conflict, and that she was dismissed because of this conflict.151
In a case in which the government was able to fire her, Davis would be able to make this showing:
throughout litigation, there has been no allegation that her religious beliefs are not sincerely held
and it is clear that her employer is aware of them. The burden would shift to the government to
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show either that it made a good faith effort to accommodate her religious practice or that an
accommodation would place an undue burden on the government.152
Although it is hard to predict how a court would answer the question of whether granting Davis
an accommodation would place an undue burden on the government, based on some similarities
between Davis’ situation and precedent, it seems likely that the court would find that requiring
such an accommodation would place an undue burden on the government. For example, in Parrott
v. District of Columbia, the District Court for the District of Columbia held that a police
department that suspended an officer who refused to restrain anti-abortion demonstrators because
of his religious beliefs did not violate Title VII.153 Although the officer argued that the cost to the
Department in excusing him was de minimis, the court pointed to the fact that the officer may not
be the only officer to have religious objections to abortion, and there were many situations in which
officers must uphold the law despite the fact that it may interfere with their religious or moral
beliefs.154 The court noted the importance of the department being able to organize its forces and
guarantee that there are enough officers at any time to enforce any law. 155 Although special
considerations involving uniformity come into play when dealing with the police force, several
analogies can be drawn between this case and Davis’ situation: both involve a branch of the
government, responsible to the citizens, and both involve a government employee refusing to carry
out a responsibility that could be a large part of their job responsibilities.156 Similarly, in Ryan v.
United States Department of Justice, the court held that the FBI did not violate Title VII when it
fired an agent who refused to investigate certain groups that were thought to be responsible for
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incidents of vandalism at military recruiting facilities.157 The court noted that forcing the FBI to
reassign the agent to different work could incur costs and would affect the morale and harmony
throughout the government agency. 158 Finally, consider Bruff v. North Mississippi Health
Services, where the court held that the employer was not required under Title VII to accommodate
a counselor who would not counsel on subjects that she believed conflicted with her religious
beliefs. 159 The court cited the undue burden of causing alternative employees to assume a
disproportionate workload. 160 In all of these cases, like in Davis’ case, the employee was
requesting an accommodation from something that was central to his or her job responsibilities. It
seems that based on these cases and others like them, a court would likely find that requiring a
deputy clerk to sign marriage licenses for same-sex couples would be an undue burden on the
department because of the cost to the government office and because of how central this
responsibility is to the County Clerk position. Thus, it seems that Davis would not have a claim
under Title VII.

C. International Comparison
Although the issue of how the government should respond to clerks, and similar government
officeholders, may seem like a novel issue in the United States in the wake of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Obergefell, the issue has been dealt with in nations that have already legalized same
sex marriage. At the time the decision in Obergefell was handed down, nineteen other nations
have countrywide mandates allowing same sex marriage.161 While it is true that the difference in
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law and governmental powers serves as a limitation on the usefulness of comparison between the
United States and other nations, and the applicability of the solutions reached by other nations, an
exploration into the procedures adopted by other nations may serve as a way to bring new ideas to
the discussion. In particular, it may be useful to briefly examine the approaches taken by England
and Canada.
In July of 2013, the Queen of England granted royal assent to a bill granting same-sex couples
in England the freedom to marry.162 This came after both the House of Lords and the House of
Commons voted in favor of the legislation several times.163 Same-sex couples were able to begin
marrying in March of 2014.164 Prior to the recognition of same sex marriage in England, samesex couples were limited to entering into civil partnerships, under the Civil Partnership Act of
2004.165 The Borough of Islington policy was that its existing registrars would serve to officiate
marriages as well as civil partnerships. Ladele objected to the requirement that she officiate civil
partnerships on the ground of her Christian beliefs. Her superiors disciplined her and threatened
to dismiss her. When she was eventually fired, after several rounds of appeals, the court held that
she could not bring a lawsuit for discrimination based on being fired for refusing to officiate civil
partnerships.166 A later decision by the European Court of Human Rights upheld this decision,
reasoning that because the rights of same-sex couples were involved, the lower courts struck the
proper balance between the employer’s right to secure the rights of others and the applicant’s right
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to practice her religion.167 The issue in England does not seem to be completely resolved, but it
appears as though the courts are taking into account the burden on the rights of same-sex couples
in analyzing the situation.
Same-sex marriage became legal in Canada in July of 2005. The Civil Marriage Act, a national
piece of legislation passed after more than seventy-five percent of the country had legalized samesex marriage, provided a gender-neutral definition of marriage.168 The issue of refusal of those
appointed to conduct same-sex marriages has been dealt with in different ways in different
jurisdictions within Canada. 169 In some jurisdictions, marriage commissioners who will not
perform same-sex marriage ceremonies are forced to resign from their positions. 170 Other
jurisdictions permit refusals by commissioners on the basis of religious or conscience. 171 There
are several variations of a middle ground approach as well. Certain jurisdictions permit refusals,
but only where the marriage commissioners could provide for a replacement commissioner to
conduct the ceremony.172 Other jurisdictions allow opt-outs for existing jurisdictions, but only
appoint new marriage commissioners who would agree to marry same-sex couples.173 The last
approach involves a “single entry point” system whereby a central office processes requests by
members of the public, thus allowing the religious beliefs of individual marriage commissioners
to be accommodated behind the scenes, rather than through confrontation with the public.174
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While, as noted above, the differing systems of law in other nations limits the usefulness of a
comparison between possible solutions in the United States, and possible solutions abroad,
examining varying solutions abroad and evaluating what has been successful and what has not
may spark new ideas about how to deal with the same problem in the United States. Although
England and Canada have had more experience with this particular problem that the United States,
as evidenced above, their solutions have not been uniform, and not enough time has passed to truly
examine the levels of success with which these solutions have been met. The Canadian approach
of allowing jurisdictions to decide independently how to approach the problem of conscientious
objectors at first glance is certainly appealing, as it seems to align nicely with American ideas of
federalism. Caution must be taken, however, in implementing such a system, because of the risk
that those tasked with creating procedures to accommodate conscientious objectors may do so in
a way that overburdens the right of same-sex couples to marry. This risk is especially present in
states that did not allow same-sex marriage before Obergefell. As such, any state-by-state system
of accommodating conscientious objectors would have to be met with some level of federal
oversight to ensure the protection of the right of same-sex couples to marry.

V.

Conclusion
While Kim Davis’ trouble may be behind her if Governor-Elect Bevin removes clerks’ names

off of marriage licenses, and the media circus surrounding her has subsided, the questions posed
by her situation are certain to continue to arise in other states, and regarding other officials whose
religious beliefs and job responsibilities come into conflict with one another since the decision in
Obergefell. It is likely that in many instances, such conflicts will be resolved through informal
accommodations, like two coworkers voluntarily switching shifts so that a religious objection does
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not arise. Such informal accommodations will not involve the guidance of the courts. Likewise,
if states follow suit and Governors and Legislatures create statutory exemptions before any
individuals file suit, the courts may not have to become involved. But, in all other cases, the courts
will become involved and will have to muddle through the confusing and sometimes conflicting
state and federal precedent in this area. It remains to be seen what, if any, protections the courts
will provide objectors like Davis, but what is sure, is that these objections will continue to arise
until some workable system is implemented.
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